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The Rent Appeal Act 1973 is an example of what mi gh~ be 
called 'Robin Hood' leg islation. However, t h e subject of its 
redistributive objective is not economic wealth but moral 
property. Moral property consists of the ri ghts, privil ege s, 
powers and im:'.l1unities 1 that g roups or individuals can ut.i...lize 
to promote and/or protect its or their interests. In :practice, 
legislative redistribution of moral pro p erty involves an 
interference by the State in a personal relationship (be it 
contractual or otherwi s e) between two or more parties by altering 
a_ual i ta ti vely a::H:/ o :r qua::1 ti ti v-3ly t ~2 YJo-::-al p r op Arty rr; "our ce:i 
that those parties can use in playing out that relationship. 
Ex8~ples of the interference a re to be found in such v a ried 
fields as consumer protection~ racial discrimination:; and 
matrimonial la~J 
The legislature's as s umption is that a change in legal 
status will be parall e led by a chang e in the 'power' status 
within the affected r e lationship. Hov, ev e r a s Galanter points 
OU t .. • •. 
"The sy s tem has the capacity to cha nge a g reat d eal 
at the level of rules without corresponding changes in every-
d tt f t · 11. 5 ay pa erns o prac ice.~ .•• 
That is, for such redistributive legislation to be effective, 
the symbolic changes it makes r.mst be translated by the 
legislative 'winners' into tang ible advantag es. G2lanter calls 
this process the upenetration 11 of rule chang es at the ::field 
level 11 • 6 
It is the basic submission of this paper that the Rent 
Appeal Act 1973 has largely failed to penetrate in this way. 
Given that it is a basic operational premise of modern 
government that 11 stateways can ch3.Ilge folkways 11 ; it is asserted 
that it is important to analyse the anatomy of this failure. 
An attempt at such an analysis of some reasons for this failure 
is the primary objective of this paper. This will be concluded 
with a brief discussion of some ways in which some of the 
deficiencies revealed by the analysis might be overcome or 
avoided. 
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Briefly, the Act makes five chang es to the legal status 
of landlords and tenants. First, and principally, it creates 
a ri ght of appea l for both parti e s in respect of rents~ This 
ri ght i s exercised by making application to a Rent Appeal Board9 
which h a s the power to assess an equitable rent1° This assess-
nent runs with the property and not the p a rties1
1 It usually 
applies f or a twelve month period
12 and it is an offence to give 
a tenant notice or to try and evict a tenant for making applicat-
ion13 Despite the fact that ~oth parties c a n apply, this ri ght 
is as s erted on the g rounds that previously, most tenants of 
private dwelli~gs had no legal means of challenging their rent , 
and that the political history of the Act indicates that tenants 
were intended to . be its principal beneficiaries~ 4 Secondly, 
S.21 of the Act places a limit on rent in advance and bonds. 
Thirdly , S2 2 prohibits the demand for premiums and other pay-
ments by landlords which mi ght un~erCTine the effects of S.21. 
?ourt) ly, by virtue of S.23 landlords . are required to provide 
a receipt conta ining specified details. This receipt becomes 
t~e property of the tena nt1 5 Fifthly, a refusal to let a 
d'.-vellinghouse to an applicant for the reason that children 
will live in the property is' ~rohibited by S.24 of the Act. 
Tenants legisla tive gains, in Hohfeldian terms, can be 
sumoarized as being represented by a right of rent appeal 
coupl e d with an i mmunity a gainst landlord retaliation;
6 an 
immunity 2.gainst the demand for certain payments by landlords; 
7 
an i:r.ununity against being refused accomodation because of their 
or other persons' children intended occupation;
8 and a ri gh\ 
to obtain and possess a proper receipt~ 9 
It is submitted that the failure of these legislative gains 
to 11 :penetrate at the field leve11120 is r.J.ainly attributable to 
deficiencies in two areas. Broadly these areas can be stated 
as being:-
The k nowl edge or "legal literacyn 21 of the primary 
p a rties (here tenants, l a n d lords and their agents.) 
0 
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The institutional response of the agencies which 
administer and enforce the legislative changes 
(collectively these agencies will be called the 
secondary parties). 
Data concern ing these areas is drawn mainly from three sources; 
p ilot surveys conducted amongst the primary parties, 22 the 
writer's involvement with a tenants organization23 and some 
statistics provide d by the Labour Department which administers 
+-~ o \ ,-..~ 24 
v.;. __ .,. - .. v~ .. 
It has bee~ said above that redistributive legislative 
ch:1ng es in the field of moral property are intended to alter 
the dynamics of 1the affected relationship. When the task of 
~ onitoring and/or mobilizing such chantes falls on the primary 
parties (as it principally doea with the Rent Appeal 1973) their 
h ~owl edg e or 'legal litera cy 125 becoces vital. This is because, 
f o r p en etra tion o f these cha n g es to occur at the field level 
t h e y cust beco~e incorporated into the set of possible behavioural 
respon s es from which actual behaviour is selected by the primary 
parties. 
Plainly,this incorporation is conditional upon the primary 
p a rties knowing about the changes. The pilot surveys indicate 
t~at ma ny of the primary parties do not know of tn.ese changes.
26 
The tenant survey27 disclosed the following information about 
tenants' knowledge of the Act. Ifost tenants have heard of the 
Rent .Appeal Boards (60/78) but only a few (19/78) claimed to 
have aYJ.y idea of knowing how to apply to them. This latter 
result is not tmimportant since the appeal process is intended 
to be a sir:iple one and aYailable to parties without the necessity 
of eng aging a lawyer. 28 Only two (2/78) respondents had made 
an application. 
Twenty-nine (29/75) respondents knew of the prohibition 
relating to landlord refusal to let a dwellinghouse because 
of their or other persons' children intended occupation. About 
h a lf (40/76) the tenants interviewed indicated that they knew 
they had an enforceable ri ght to a 'proper' receipt. Forty-one 
0 
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( 41 /7,'3) also knew that there is some limit on· rent in advance 
and bonds. However, only four (4/78) knew the exact nature 
of the limitation while another twenty-five (25/78) had an 
idea of the limi tation which fell within the Act's req_uirements. 
1here were t wenty-one (21/78 ) respondents who thought that a 
government department was involved in some way with landlord-
ten2.nt ?roblems or relations. Only ten (10/78) respondents 
spec ifically mentioned the Labour Department. 
Al l l andlords interviewed29 had heard of the Rent Appeal 
3,J a rd. :\si~ni:ic ant numbe r o.f tn.ese (_17/26) iYJ.di c3.ted that 
they viewed the Boards primarily as tribunals for the protection 
of tenants from hi gh rents. No landlord respondents had applied 
to the Board and only two (2/26) had had a tenant of theirs apply. 
Sight ( 8 /24) respondents knew that an assessment by the Board 
usually applied for twelve (12) months. Thirteen (13/24) landlords 
thought t~at the assessment applied to the property and not 
the parties, while six (6/24) though t t he contrary and five 
(5/24) said they did not know. Only ten (10/25) respondents 
k new of the prohibition relating to the re fu s a l to let a 
d'.ve llingho use to an. applicant tenant with children. Most l andlords 
intervi ewed (1 8 /26) were aware that it is an offence not to 
g ive a proper receipt. Most of them (19/25) also knew that there 
i s a li~it on bonds but only seven (7/25) knew the exact nature 
of the limi tation with another ei ght (8/25) having some idea. 
Only four (4/26) respondents knew of the involvernent of the 
Labour Department with the Act. 
All letting agents30 interviewed were aware of the Rent Appeal 
Boards. Eleven (11/21) respondents have had tenants apply to the 
Board. Twelve (12/2~) of them knew the usual assessment period 
and eleven (11/20) knew the assessment applied to the relevant 
property and not the parties. I•lost agents (18/21) knew of the 
pro~ibition relating to the refusal under S.24. All agents knew 
~· 
that there was some limitation on bonds but only twelve (12/21) 
knew the exact limitation. All agents knew that they are required 
to give a proper receipt. Only nine(9/21) of them knew of the 
involvement of the Labour Department in this area. 
Generally, less than half the tenants interviewed demonstrated 
0 
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that they knew of the legisla tive gains con taine d for them in 
the Rent App eal Act 1973. Even £ e wer of them showed that t h ey 
k new of t he chan g es in such a way as to be able to mobilize 
t h e secondary par t ies. The l andlord re s p ondents appea red to 
know rn o:ce t h an the tenant respond ents a b out the Act. However, 
many landlords appear to be unaware of t h e various duties and 
disab ilities c a st upon them by the Act. As expected, the 
k nowl e dg e of letting agents proved to be superior to that of 
either l andlords or tenants, yet it was f a r fro m satisfactory. 
:? o :: exa.'Tl:p l~, "c;~'le f a ct tha t n early h a l f the agents i ntervi e wed 
did not know the exact limitation set by the Act on bonds and 
rent in advance is surely cause for alarm for a group which 
. ' . t t . ~ f · ·1 · 31 :i.s see.King o promo e an imag e OI pro essiona ism. 
This g enerally poor knowledg e of the primary p a rties of the 
Rent App eal Act 1973 is reflected in the difference between the 
n u.I!lber of potential breaches of !. the Act indics.ted by the tenant 
survey and the n1.unber of complaints alleging breaches received 
by th e La bour Dep a rtment. 32 For example, s even (7/70) tena.YJ.ts 
thought they h a d been re f used a flat in the last t wo yea rs 
becaus~ of their or oth er persons' children intended occupa tion. 
Of these seven (7) respondents, five (5) had small children. 
Only six of the other respondents (6/63) had small children. 
J hese results suggest t h at pot ential breaches of S.24 Rent 
Appeal Act 1973 on a national sc ale33 runs into hundreds. 
However, up to the 31.3.76, the Department has only ever received 
five (5) complaints under this section, of which only one (1) 
resulted in court action. 34 Similarly, the tenant survey revealed 
tha t the number of complaints to the Department in respect of 
bonds and receipts gives a false perspective of what happens 
in practice. Thirty-nine (39/78) respondents paid a bond. 
Inquiries into thirty-seven (37) of these showed that seven (7) 
of them did not comply with the Act. igain this suggests that 
there are many more potential offences than those alleged to 
--~ 
the Dep a rtment (up to the 31.3.76 -115 ; offences). Twelve (12/72) 
tenants did not g et a receipt and one (1) other respondent 
wa s found to g et an inadequate rec e ipt. T~e l a bour Department 
(up to 31.3.76) has only ever receive d four (4) complaints about 
rec e ipts! The differences between the official compla ints and 
-6-
actual landlord behaviour highlighted by these examples confirms 
the obvious point that partie s who do not know of new legal 
norms c annot conplain of breaches of the~ or conform to them. 
So f a r under this heading of Knowledge, the issue has_been 
how rnuch .tenants a.rid landlords/agents know about t h e changes 
rnade by the Rent Appeal Act 1973 to their legal status. Some 
of the results of the tenant survey35 ilustrate that the question 
of how the parties perceive such ch3.nges ( even if they are aware 
of them) is equaly important. For instance, it is stated above 
T:l ~ - ~o~+ ~~~ ~  fr0/7° ) h·:i.a· ~ ~~ ~  of ~CL n ~ 0n + ·u~~al ~a -d " " _\, ··" .:,, v _____ ., 0  0 - -C. _ _ -:;_.,_ _lr.; n ~ v A.__;_J<-•- - .:l a.J . " s , 
yet in three previous questions which al gave the tenant 
respondents an opp rtunity to mention the Rent Appeal Boards 
no ·more tha.ri eighteen ( 18/78) gave that response. 36 It was 
apparent to the writer who interviewed the 1najority of the tenants 
that going to the Rent Appeal Board just did not occur to most 
of them as an available response in the event of a rent rise. 
That is, only a few of the respondents who knew of the Rent Appeal 
Boards had adop t e d t~at knowledg e into the behavioural 
poss i bilities for their role as tenant. This suggests that for 
the knowledg e of the ch&'16es to be embodied into the fabric of 
the tena.rit-lar1dlord/agent relationship that knowledge needs 
to be personalized as 1tenant-landlord/agent1 knowledge. This 
suggestion is consistent withthe perspective of the legislative 
changes as being bits of moral property. ~hat is, inherent in 
the word property is the concept of ownership. Few of the tenant 
r espondents, as 'owr:.ers' of the right to rent a ppeal, could 
identify it as belonging to them. 
This later point highlights the need for feedback from · 
the secondary parties. Feedback tends to identify the legislative 
ch&~ges as belonging to the primary parties. This is simply 
because such feedback shows Qther legislative winners realizing 
their symbolic gains and other legislative losers suffering 
from actual losses. ,By such examples· the legislative changes 
are transformed from lifeless bts of information into real, 
possible behavioural responses that can be employed in the 
relationship. The potency of such feedback was revealed to the 
writer when conducting the landlord/ surveys. Nearly al 
the respondents in these surveys when asked about1proper receipts,37 
1 0 j 
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referred- to a recent newspaper account of a landlord who had 
been prosecuted and convicted for failing to give such a 
receipt3~ Furt~er, the absence of feedback generated by the 
act ivities of the secondary parties tends to create a 'know-
ledge deprivation cycle 1 ~9tha t is, a low volurne of feedback 
perpetuates a low level of awareness which in turn limits the-
number of parties with thepotential to monitor the rule changes 
and Dobilize the secondary parties in the event of a breach 
of the ne-.v rules and so forth. The data set out 2.bove suggests 
that this k ind of cycle is operating in respect of the Rent 
Appeal Act 1973. 10 
The steps taken to publicize the Act h a ve been limited. 
Official advertising to date amounts to an explanatory brochure , 
on the rent appeal process published and distributed by the 
Labour I)epa.rtment.nearly two years after the Act came into 
operation. Several tenants organi zations 41 have criticized both 
t~e content and distribution of this brochure as being inadequate 
to effedt any substantial improvement in tenants' knowledge. 
'.i:he re sults of the teriant survey tend to confirm the validity 
of this criticism12 The volume of information produced by the 
med iahas also been small, consisting mainly of reports on 
infrequent court actions arising from prosecu~ions made under 
the Act 43 and occasional reports of Rent Appeal B0 ard hearings. 
The oain source of publicity for the Act has been the ~arious 
tenants organizations. However, they are quick to point out 
tne inade q_uacyof_their attempts at publicity when they are 
handicapped by the usual lack of funds and the administrative 
difficulties experienced by voluntary organizations. In view 
of the fact that no comprehensive attempt has eyer been made 
to inform the primary parties of the contents and the signific-
anceof the Rent Appeal Act 1973, it is not surprising that 
many of them do not know about it or do not appreciate the ,..--
consequences it has for their role as either a tenant or a 
landlord. 
-0 
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IKSTI~UTIONAL RESPONSE 
Institutional response is significant fo~ the penetration 
of rule changes at the field level in two ways. First, it 
determines in what circumstances individual legislative winners 
can get endorsement of 1.their symbolic ..: gains. This is because ••• 
11 
••••• 'dha t people get from government is what administrators 
do about their problems rather than the promises of statutes, 
constitutions, or oratory. 1144 
Secondly, as already indicated45 the volume and the character 
of the feedback generated by the responses of the administrative 
and enforcement agencies has a strong influence on how much 
.the primary parties know and on their appreciation of the con-
sequences that information has for the dynamics of their rela-
tionship. These two aspects will be discussed in respect of the 
the two principal institutions that are involved with the Rent 
appea l Act 1973, namely the Labour Department and the Rent 
Appeal 3oards. 
The first evidence of the institutional response of the 
Labour Depa rt~ent in respect of the Act is drawn from the 
Department's own statistics; that is, most complaints are 
"settled by the Department . 1146 in the first complaint'year' (i.e. 
1.2.74 to 31.3.75) of the eighty-seven ( 8 7) complaints lodged, 
sixty-four (64) complaints were dealt with in this way while 
the balance (23) resulted in court action. In the second complaint 
year ( 31 . 3.75 to 31.3.76) ninety-two (92) complaints were made 
of which only four (4) resulted in court a ction. 
These statistics pose a question; 'Why is it that so few 
complaints result in prosecutions by the Department?" 
It is asserted that this result is principally explained by 
the method the Department deals with the complaints. This method 
is stated by a Department Officer as being ••••• 
"••oo• On receivin6 a complaint- under the Rent Appeal Act 1973, 
the complaint is investigated by the District Office of the 
Department of Labour where it was received. If it appears a 
breach has occurred a recommendation for prosecution is sent 
-9-
to the Department's Head Office where it is referred to the 
Depar tment's Legal Division. 1147 -
It is the writer's experience from his involvement with a 
tenants organization that the District Offices often take an 
extremely cautious approach when dealing with alleged breaches 
of the Act. 48 This cautiousness manifests itself in administrat-
ive delays in dealing with complaints. 49 Confronted with this 
situation conplainant tenants often lose the momentum they have 
at the time they lodge the complaint and, as a consequence, 
~~ey do no~ pursue the mat~er. Su ch no~e~ t um i3 ne3ded to play 
the i.1long-run strategies 1i50 that are often required to bring 
about the realization of symbolic gains. Further, the pilot 
survey results reveal that most tenants, unlike most landlords, 
would probably not enlist the aid of personnel who are eg_uipped 
to play "long-run strategies 11 ~ 1 Only fifteen (15/78) tenants 
said they woulcl. get assistance from a lawyer in the event of 
some problem or argument with their landlord while seventeen 
(17/26) landlords gave that response to a similar question. 
A further thirty (30/78) tenants said they would 6 0 to a tenants 
organi zation • . However, the writer's experience revealed that 
these or6 anizations also often lack the resources to conduct 
"long-run strategies" to secure implementation of the rule 
changes. ~he writer's experience in this field also suggests 
that unless complainants can overcome the Department's 'inertia' 
in dealing with the complaint then the Department, like the 
tena..YJ.t, will probably not pursue the matter. Consequently, no 
recommendation for prosecution is put forward to trigger the 
involvement of Head Office which is better equipped to further 
investigate the complaint by virtue of its Legal Division. 
For tenants then, as the legislative winners, the character 
of the response of the Labour Department towards complaints 
set out above suggests that it is not easy for them to invoke 
and mobilize the sanctioning power of that Department against 
recalcitrant landlords or letting agents. The Department's own 
statistics tend to support this view. 52 For instance, in the 
second year of the Act's operation (i.e. 31.3.75 to 31.3.76) 
sixty-two (62) complaints were made in respect of S.21. Only 
0 
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on e (1) o f these complaints result e d in a prosecution by the 
Department. In the li ght of the character of the breaches of 
S.21 that were uncovered by the tenant survey, the writer finds 
it v ery difficult to accept that none of .the other sixty-one 
(61) complaints warranted court action. This kind of response 
a l s o takes the substance out of the legislative gain as an aid 
to bargaining and negotiating with landlords because the threat 
to complain to the Labour Department usually ends up being a 
rather empty one. The fact that most complaints are ''settled 
"h y t ~1e .De:9ar t:-:1en t " a l so had t h e ~f f e ct of f urthe-r restricting 
the volume of feedback to the primary parties. That is, the 
fallout of information created by the complaint which might be 
aosorbed by other primary parties is iso-lated and contained 
within the Depar_tment. Because neither private tenants nor . 
landlords are in any way a homogeneous 5 roup
53 the possibility 
of distrib ution of this information by word of mouthis remote. 
The only feedback produced by the Labour Department available 
to tenan ts in the second year of the Act's operation probably 
consist s of four local newspaper reports of the court actions 
the Department undertook in that time. This would hardly be 
sufficient to cause the substantial improve6ent in the 'legal 
literacy' of the primary parties that was shown as being required
 
by the pilot surveys. Overall, it seems that the institutional 
response of the Labour Department impedes rather than facilit-
ates individual tenants in ·their attempts to utilize their 
symbolic legislative gains with the additional result that 
very little feedback of information to the primary parties is 
produced. 
In comparison, the institutional response of the Rent 
Appeal Boards has been much more conducive to the 'penetration' 
of the right to rent appeal for individual tenants and landlords.
 
On the basis of the writer's involvement witl1 the Wellington 
3oard54 it is argued that this response can be principally 
explained by the fact tha t after application, the Boards, unlike 
the Department, assume an active role. The application sets in 
motion a procedure 55 which tends to carry the parties along 
with it. Indeed, the Wellington Board(under the chairmanship 
of Hon. W.A. Fox
56 ) often exercised its discretion to hear 
-11-
applications where the applicant did not appear at the hearing~
7 
This particular Board also assisted parties in exercising their 
rights by cul ti va ting an L1formal atmo spnere \vhich, in 
particular , had the effect of both g iving unrepresented parties 
confidence to promote their claims and minimizing any disad-
vantage inheren t in not having repres entation. 
However , despite these kind of features of the response of 
the Boards , the 'drop-out' rate of applicants is very high. 
Since , with the exception of the Christchurc~ Board~
8 most 
'Cl '.) n l i ,--, 3 T" i O (1 8 ~ y • "' ,-, ::::, c_i c, 1~ -y j-- '°' "1 r:, -,,, -'-- S ( ~ 00 IJ U + ·" 0 C I \ 
;,... ..'.. ~.) __ ......,. • ,,.1 _, -· ·'"J. _ \_, J l.1,(_.,_. t. V ~· .., .._, ..:..- ....:: l.._:..L l,.. \ .:::!. V ;J 1!J)' it is concluded 
that most lap sed or withdrawn applications are tenant applications. 
Of the one thousand and one (1,001) applications made between 
the 1.2.74 and the 31.3.75, six hundred and forty-one (641) 
lapsed or were withdrawn prior to a hearing by the relevant 
Board . 59 . one eYpl anation for this might be that the parties 
negotiated. t heir own 'assessment'. In the writer's experience 
this is unlikely. This vi ew is supported by some answers in the 
l andlo;::-d/agent surveys where only four (4/23) lar..dlords and 
three (3/21) agent s said that they would negotiate in the event 
of a rent appeal application by one of their tenants. A nore 
probable ezplanantion i s that the del a y experienced in getting 
a hearing is ;_ the cause for the large numbe r of lapsed or 
i,vi thdrawn applications. It taJ<:es about six ( 6) weeks and often 
longer f ro m the time of application before a hearing by the 
Board is held. This may not appear a very long time to wait. 
rtowever, the act of making an application by a tenant usually 
creates stresses in what is often already a strained relationship 
which tests the endurance of the parties. The inherent strength 
of the lP...ndlord' s status
60 and his strategic adva!ltages
61 often 
proves too much for tenants who respond by withdrawing from 
the rel a tionship. Further, many tenants leave before the procedure 
of the Rent Appeal Boards get under way so that the momentum ~ 
of t~e rent appeal process referred to above
62 has nothing to 
act upon. Again it seems that administrative delay works against 
the interests of legislative winners and for the interests of 
the legislative losers. 
Most applications to the Boards result in a reduction in 
rent or in a proposed rent increase (the usual reason for making 
-12-
application). However , transmission of this and other feedback 
about the response parti es can expect from the Boards is almost 
entirely li~ited to word of mouth reports by individual part-
icipants in the rent appeal process. This perhaps explains the 
smal l nrunber of tenant r.espondents who thought of the Rent Appeal 
noard3 as a means of challeng ing a rent rise. This highlights 
the need for an active interplay between the primary and secon-
dary parties. The absence of such interplay tends to starve 
each party of the material need to stimulate the involvement of 
CONCLUSION 
The basic working hypothesis of this paper has been that 
for redis t ributive legislative changes to be anything more than 
token gestures to the legisla tive winners, they must be able to 
transform those changes into tangible rewards. In the case of 
the Rent Appeal Act 1973 that means things like getting an 
assessment from the Rent Appeal Boards, get ting a proper receipt, 
not b eing refused a flat bec au se of one's children and not 
beir-g re~uired to pay certain payments to landlords. It also 
means bein6 able to force compli ance fro m recalcitrant land-
lords. Yet, data set out in this paper shows that frequently 
neither of these events occur.
63 This paper sets out and discusses 
the two main reasons why this happens. Obviously the next 
q_uestion is, · 'How can the factors vrhich prevent tenants getting 
~he benefit of the legislative c~anges be overcome?' 
The solution t.o the poor knowledge of tenants and lan.dlords/ 
agents of the Act is plainly to tell them about it. Provision 
for infor~ing the primary parties ought to have been provided 
for by the legislature in the first place. It seems shortsighted 
not to do so when the tasks of rnoni toring the legislative change_s 
and mobilizing the secondary parties are cast upon the primary 
parties. such provision could take the form of a statutory duty 
being cast on the secondary parties to inform the primary parties. 
It is asserted that this would be the major step to improve the 
inpact the legislation has on the relationship of the affected 
parties. 
-13-
The features of1~he institutional response of the Labour 
Department and the Rent Appeal ·Boards which make it more 
difficult for tenants to take advantage of their legislative 
gains are not as simple to overcome. However, it is apparent 
from the analysis that any possible solutions ought to be directed 
at capitalizing on the initial momentum the complainant or 
applicant tenant has at the time the relevant institution is 
first approached so as to reduce the tenant 'drop-out' rate. 
For the Labour Department, a more aggressive atitude when 
de~li~g wi t h co3plain~s and a n ear l i e r i n volv~~ent of ~~  L ~gal 
Division of Head Office would probably have this effect. It 
seems tnat the present procedure adopted by the Rent Appeal 
3oards in dealing with applications to some extent already have 
--chis effect but it is suggested that the reduction of the tine 
between the application is lodged and when it is the subject of 
a hearing . It is speculated that these kind of changes to the 
response of these two institutions would result in more 
prosecutions by the Department and more assessments by the 
Rent Appeal Boards. Consequently, more individual tenants would 
get tangible rewards for pursuin~ their symbolic advantages. 
This would also generate more feedback which informs other 
tenants and landlords/agents cl.bout the legislative changes. 
It is in these two ways that the institutional response of the 
secondary parties "is the crucial determinant of what.sort of 
impact a le6al norm wil have.1164 
Fi~aly,it is concluded that the analysis which was atempted 
in this paper supports the view that •• e,. 
11 ••••• a change at the level of substantive rules is not likely 
in itself to be determinative of redistributiv e outcomes.1165 
This is not to deny the fundamental validity of the operational 
premise that •stateways can change folkways'. However, it is 
asserted that the analysis does establioh that the validity o f 
this premise is conditional on legislators recognizing that 
rule chan8es •·•·• 
11 •••• • do not penetrate automaticaly and costlessly to other 66 levels of the system ••• " 
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APPENDIX A: PI LOT SURVEYS 
f.iE '.;;nODOLOGY &:, :B ACKGROUND 
(1) Ten a.nt Survey 
This survey was co n~ucted during May-June 1976 witiin 
ihe boundarie s of Welling ton City.Re spon dents were 
drawn from five(5) s uburb s in approx. equal nu~ oers. 
B. espondents from all kinds of flats were approached. 
Only one(1) tenant fro m each flat was interviewed.Flats 
were vi s ited ou tside normal worki~~ hours. ·ThP · ~ _ main 
Jefec ts of th e survey a r e that; 
(a) l~ o polynesian respondents,many of whom are tenants in 
the survey area,were included. 
( b )Many of the questions are of a leading nature. 
It is speculated that these last two points probably 
t hat tenants know less than the survey indicates. 
fib.Th e nwnber of respondents varies for some questions. 
(2) Iandlord Survey 
This survey was conducted by phon e in June 1976. 
Respo~d ents were selec~ed by taking telephone numbers 
from the 'To Let' column s of two newspapers.Three publish-
ing dates of each newspaper were used.Most 'live' calls 
resulted in a response.All landlords interviewed 
managed their properties themselves.All interviewing .was 
compl~ted outside working hours.The main defect of this 
survey was the leading nature of the questions. 
Nb.The number of respondents varies for some questions. 
(3)Letting Agen~ survey 
This survey was also conducted by phone in June 1976. 
Respondents were contacted by phoning real estate firms 
and asking for th~ir 'letting agent 1 .Most agents 
contacted agreed to participate.It was established that 
all the respondents were actively involved in letting 
properties on behalf of landlords. 
Letting Agents were asked the same questions as landlords. 
Their responses appear in the brackets a~ter landlord 
responses. 
Q. !'0. 
1 
2 
3a 
3b 
4a 
4b 
5 
6 
TEN.ANT SURVEY : Questions and Responses 
TOTAL NO . 01<' 
QUESTION RESPONSE RESµONDENTS 
If your landlord 
raised your rent $2 
per week , what would 
you do? 
* N. B. Some respon-
dents gave more 
than one respon~e. 
If your lanlord 
raised your rent 
.,; 1 0 per wk . what 
would you do? 
*t . B. Some respon-
dents gave mo re 
than one response. 
Do you know of any 
way that you mi ght 
be able to get your 
rent reduced? 
(I i" yes to 3a ) 
What is that wa y? 
Hav e you ever 
heard of the Rent 
Appeal Board? 
(If yes to 4a) 
Do you know how to 
apply to it? 
Is it against the 
Law to r efuse to 
rent a flat to 
someone because~ 
children will live 
in the flat? 
Rent Appeal 9 
:i:s2nants organ-
ization. 4 
Leave. 8 
Accept. 42 
Complain. 16 
Negoti ate . 5 
Other. 2 
Don 't know. 4 
Rent appeal. 11 
Tenants Org. 12 
Leave. 28 
.Accept. 8 
Complain. 12 
Negotiate. 4 
La~yer. 4 
Other. 2 
Don't know . 4 
Yes . 
No. 
27 
51 
Rent Appeal. 18 
Other. 9 
Yes. 60 
No. 18 
Yes. 
No. 
Yes. 
No. 
Bon't know. 
19 
41 
29 
17 
29 
In the l as t two y ears Yes. 
do you think you h a ve No. 
been refused a flat 
because your or other 
persons ch ildren 
7 
63 
would live in the flat. 
78 
78 
78 
27 
78 
60 
75 
70 
1 
0 
j 
0. ilO . 
7 
8 
9a 
9b 
10 
11 
12 
13b 
-A 3-
QUESTION 
Ca.n a l andlord be 
prosecuted for not 
giving a proper 
receipt or keeping 
a proper rent book? 
RESPONSE 
Yes. 40 
No . 4 
Don ' t know . 32 
Does your l andlord Yes. 53 
g ive you a receipt No. 12 
or sign a rent b ook Cheque Bk . 7 
Vlhich you keep? 
Is there any li~it YAs . 41 
on how muca bond a 10 . 4 
landlord c2.n ask for?Don ' t kno i:i . 33 
(If yes to 9a) 
What is the limit-
ation? 
Ca.11 a landlord 
be prosecuted for 
charging too large 
2. bond? 
Do you pay a bond? 
* 37 of these were 
checked for co mpli -
ance . 
If you had a problem 
or arguement with 
your landlord and 
you wanted some help 
with that situation 
who would y ou g o to? 
* Some respondents 
gave more than one 
response. 
Are there any Govt. 
Depts . that deal in 
any \1 ay with land-
lord/ tenant problems 
or relations? 
If yes which Dept/s 
Knew. 4 
Approx. 25 
I ncorrect. 12 
Yes. 34 
No . 5 
Don ' t know . 39 
Yes . 39 
Hon compli-
ance . 7 
Lawyer. 15 
Tenants o r g .30 
Legal Ad.vice 
Bureau . 1 
Govt , Dept 7 
Family/ frienc.6 
Agent. 8 
Don't know . 14 
Other. 2 
Yes. 
No . 
Don't 
21 
9 
know. 48 
Lab. Dept. 10 
Other .7 
Don't know 4 
TOTAL llO . <'.IF 
RES?ONDEN11S 
76 
72 
78 
41 
78 
78 
78 
78 
21 
0 
1 
0 
=, 
0 . l~O . 
1 
2 
3 . 
4 
5a 
5b 
6 
- A { -
LAl'TDLORJ) & LETTING AGE1'iT SURVEY : Ques tions 
( Agent r esponses i n -b r a ckets) 
QUES'i1ION RESPONSE 
Have you ever heard Yes . 26 (21) 
of tb.e Rent Appeal 
Boar d? 
· ..vhat does the .Rent Cont ro l 
Appeal Bd . d o? r ent s . 9( 5) 
*Some responden t s P rot e cts t enants re g a v e mo r e t han hi gh ren t s. 17( 9) one re s ponse . I n v :?st i Ja t es 
ren ·cs . 5( 2) 
Assess e s 
rents. 12( 8 ) 
Fo r how l ong does knew .8(12) 
an assessment by d i dn!t know 16(9) 
· the n.en t Ap . :ad. 
app l y? 
Does the rent Property 12( 11) 
assessment app l y Parties 6 ( 5 ) 
to t r1e p a rties or Don ' t know 5 ( 4 ) 
the property? 
A.re y ou ent i t led Ye s . 10 ( 3) 
t o refuse a fl a t to No. 13(1 8 ) 
2. person becaus e Don't k n ow 2(-) 
children will live 
i n . '9 l "t . 
I s there any Law t o Yes . 11(14) 
prev ent y ou re f us- No. 9 ( 3) 
i ng someone on thoseDon't know 6( 4) g r ound s ? 
Coul d you be 
p ro secut e d for not 
g i v ing a t enan t a 
p ro per re c eipt? 
Yes. 18(21) 
No. 3(-) 
Don't k now. 5(-) 
~ 
and Responses ' ~ TOT AL NO.OF RESPONDENTS 
"" 
26 (21) ~ . 
t--\ • 
-0 
~ 
tl' 
-t) 
24(21) fi_ -· ~ 
(J\ 
23 (20) 
_g 
25 ( 21) I 
0 
j 
26(21) 
26(21) 
Q . :i:W . 
7a 
7b 
8 
9a 
9b 
-A 5-
CU:2S'l' I0N RESPOH~E 
Is there any limit on Yes. 
how much bond you can No. 
ask for? Don't know. 
If yes to abo ve Knew. 
what is the limitation D~n't know . 
19(21) 
2(-) 
5(-) 
7(12) 
12( 9) 
If you h ad a problem 
or argument with one 
of your tenants & you 
wanted soine help who 
Lawyer . . . 17 
Police . 2 
Govt .De:pt . 1 
Landlords Org . 1 
·qo~ld y~ u ~ o to? Le~al Al7i8e 
*Only landlords asked. Bureau . 
**Three re spondents 
gave more than one 
response. 
. Are there any Govt. 
Depts . that deal in 
any way with landlord 
-tenant problems o:n 
rel ations '? 
If yes to above 
\·ihi eh Dept. / s ? 
No -one. 
Other 
Don 't know. 
Yes. 
No. 
Don't know . 
Lab. Dept . 
Other. 
2 
3 
1 
2 
13(13) 
2(3) 
11 ( 5) 
4(9) 
9(4 ) 
TOTAL NO.OF 
RESPOND:EI'i T,S 
26(2 1) 
19(21) 
26 
26(21) 
13(1 3) 
0 
1 
0 
j 
Section 
r 
I 
! 
I s . 20 
i 
i 
I 
I s . 21 
I 
! 
'· I 
I 
3 . 22 
I s . 23 
I 
S . 24 
j Other 
I 
I 
S . 20 
S . 21 
I s . 22 
s . 23 
S . 24 
Ot her 
APPENDIX B. 
LABOUR DEP ARTFE?{T STATI srrr CS . 
COi{PLAI NTSY RELATI NG TO ?.ErfT APPEAL ACT 
Settled by Court Acti on Settl ed by t h e Dept. 
For the y ear ended 31. 3 .75 
6 7 
17 36 
10 
2 
1 
8 
For the year ended 3 1. 3 .7 6 
2 15 
1 61 
1 
2 
1 3 
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